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The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment
and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data*
INTRODUCTION
1

Smart meters know when you’re sleeping. They know when
you’re awake. They might even know whether you’re in the shower or
watching TV.2 Utility companies are steadily installing these smart
meters on consumers’ homes.3 Unlike traditional energy meters,
which show a household’s aggregated electricity use each month,
smart meters collect fine-grained, minute-by-minute data about
electricity use and transmit it back to the utility at regular intervals.4
This data, when collected over time and analyzed, can reveal the
activities and behavioral patterns of a household.5 Utility records
have long been of interest in law enforcement investigations,6 and the
* © 2015 Natasha H. Duarte.
1. Smart meters, also referred to as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (“AMI”), are
electronic utility meters that enable two-way communication between utilities and
consumers. See Recovery Act Smart Grid Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Advanced
Metering Infrastructure and Customer Systems, SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov
/recovery_act/deployment_status/ami_and_customer_systems (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
These meters “collect highly granular data on individual electricity consumption and allow
users to monitor and remotely control their electrical use . . . .” Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy
and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 200 (2011).
2. See 2 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID
CYBERSECURITY 27 (2010) [hereinafter NIST], available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1.pdf (concluding that, when analyzed, smart meter data
can reveal information about people’s lifestyles and appliance use); Jordan Robertson,
Your Outlet Knows: How Smart Meters Reveal Behavior at Home, What We Watch on TV,
BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-10/your-outletknows-how-smart-meters-can-reveal-behavior-at-home-what-we-watch-on-tv.html
(reporting on a German study where researchers were able to ascertain the specific
television programs people were watching based on data collected by smart meters).
3. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. SMART GRID
CASE STUDIES 1 (2011), available at https://www.smartgrid.gov/sites/default/files/doc/
files/smartggrid%5B1%5D.pdf (“A recent report . . . predicts that U.S. smart meter
installations will exceed 80 million by 2015, up from 2 million in 2007.”). But see Smart
Electric Meters, Advanced Metering Infrastructure, and Meter Communications: Global
Market Analysis and Forecasts 2014, NAVIGANT RES., http://www.navigantresearch.com/
research/smart-meters (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (“The smart electric meter market has
shifted emphasis to projects in Europe and Asia Pacific while the once hot U.S. market
has leveled off, as federal funding for projects has been nearly exhausted.”).
4. See Smart Meter Deployments Continue to Rise, EIA (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8590.
5. See NIST, supra note 2, at 27; Robertson, supra note 2.
6. BRANDON J. MURRILL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42338, SMART METER
DATA: PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY 5 (2012), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/
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detailed information contained in smart meter data can provide police
with infinitely more insight into people’s homes.7
Traditionally, law enforcement would need a warrant to gain
access to one’s home.8 However, smart meters take information about
the activities that occur inside the home and put it in the hands of a
third party—the utility company.9 Under the Third-Party Doctrine,
that information loses Fourth Amendment protection and becomes
subject to warrantless collection.10 This counter-intuitive result is
produced by a line of Fourth Amendment cases that have
conceptualized privacy as binary: personal information is either
private or has been shared with a third party for any reason, making it
public.11
misc/R42338.pdf (“In the past, law enforcement agents have examined monthly electricity
usage data from traditional meters in investigations of people they suspected of illegally
growing marijuana.”). For legal background on law enforcement’s use of utility records,
see generally United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012);
United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2011); Idaho v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993); New Jersey v. Domicz, 871 A.2d 744 (N.J. Super. 2005).
7. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (“As we progress into the 21st century, access
to personal data, including information generated from smart meters, is a new frontier for
police investigations.”); Joint Comments of the Center for Democracy & Technology and
the Electronic Frontier Foundation on Proposed Policies and Findings Pertaining to the
Smart Grid 4, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Smart Grid Tech., RM 08-12-009
(Pub. Util. Comm’n of the State of Cal. Dec. 18, 2008), available at https://www.eff.org/
files/cdteffjointcomment030910.pdf [hereinafter CDT & EFF Joint Comments].
8. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“The Fourth Amendment provides
that ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’ . . . With few exceptions,
the question [of] whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence
constitutional must be answered no.” (alteration in original)).
9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10. See McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111–12 (applying Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979), in which the Court found no expectation of privacy in phone records “voluntarily
conveyed” to a telephone company, and holding that the same was true of utility records
“voluntarily conveyed” to a utility company). For an explanation of the Third-Party
Doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 53–64.
11. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979). (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for treating privacy as a “discrete commodity, possessed absolutely
or not at all”); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002)
(arguing that courts, in “treating exposure to a limited audience as identical to exposure to
the world,” have failed “to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth Amendment
context”); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119,
136–37 (2004) (arguing that current legal approaches express “a right to privacy in terms
of dichotomies—sensitive and non-sensitive, private and public, government and
private . . . . That which falls within any one of the appropriate halves warrants privacy
consideration; for the rest, anything goes”). Daniel Solove has referred to this concept as
“privacy as secrecy”—if information is no longer totally secret, it is public. Daniel Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1107 (2002) (“In a variety of legal
contexts, the view of privacy as secrecy often leads to the conclusion that once a fact is
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Since the adoption of the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test in Katz v. United States,12 courts have relied on public/private
dichotomies as substitutes for genuine inquiries into society’s
expectations of privacy.13 The Third-Party Doctrine epitomizes this
binary approach, holding that information disclosed to a third party
under any circumstances is public.14 The doctrine has been invoked to
remove Fourth Amendment protection from financial records,15
phone records,16 cell site location data,17 email records,18 and Internet
browsing data.19 Much of our personal information—whom we call or
email, what we buy, what we read, where we travel—is contained in
electronic records, and many of these records are stored on thirdparty servers.20 By removing constitutional privacy protections from

divulged in public, no matter how limited or narrow the disclosure, it can no longer remain
private.”).
12. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 113–14 (2010); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 7 (2007); Danielle
Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 826–27 (2010) (citing Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The
Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 247–50
(1987)); Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643,
657–59 (2013); Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy
Problem, 65 S.C. L. REV. 373, 377–80 (2013).
14. See Colb, supra note 11, at 122.
15. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
16. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.
17. See generally United States. v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding
government’s violation of the Stored Communications Act did not require suppression of
defendant’s historical cell cite location data); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724
F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard is
not applicable to historical cell site information); In re Application of U.S.A. for an Order
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c) and 2703(d) Directing AT&T, Sprint/Nextel, T-Mobile,
Metro PCS and Verizon Wireless to Disclose Cell Tower Log Information, No. M-30, 2014
WL 4388397 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014) (holding the Fourth Amendment did not preclude
the government from requiring providers to disclose historical cell site data); United
States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Vt. 2013) (holding that defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his real time cell phone location information); United
States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012) (finding that defendants did not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in historical cell site location records); United States v.
Gordon, No. 09-153-02 (RMV), 2012 WL 8499876 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2012) (finding that no
reasonable expectation of privacy exists for cell site location data shared with third
parties).
18. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2007).
19. Id.
20. See Spencer, supra note 13, at 390–91 (“[T]he Internet service providers on whom
we rely for essential connectivity record the websites we visit, the files we download, and
the people whom we email or message. Everyday transactions, both online and in real
space, convey a plethora of data to third parties.”).
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this vast swath of data, the Third-Party Doctrine has swallowed the
Fourth Amendment. Scholars have argued that the Third-Party
Doctrine’s blunt approach does not fit the reality of digital data.21
Some scholars have advanced a “contextual approach” to Fourth
Amendment privacy—one that looks to social norms to determine
whether a particular disclosure is “expected” under the
circumstances.22
With its recent decision in Riley v. California,23 the Supreme
Court has taken an encouraging step toward a more contextual
approach to digital privacy.24 In Riley, a unanimous Court refused to
extend the search-incident-to-arrest warrant exception to the contents
of an arrestee’s cell phone.25 Although Riley did not deal directly with
the Third-Party Doctrine,26 it weakened the doctrine’s assumptions in
at least two ways. First, the Riley Court acknowledged that digital
data, stored and aggregated in large quantities, can reveal a detailed
picture of an individual’s private life, imbuing each individual piece of
data with an informational value that it might not have had standing
alone.27 In fact, the Court compared the contents of a cell phone to
the contents of one’s home.28 Second, and more importantly, the
Court rejected the assumption that expectations of privacy are binary
when it held that an arrestee could forfeit Fourth Amendment
protection in a cigarette pack but not a cell phone, even if both were
stored in his pocket.29

21. See, e.g., id. at 376 (describing the ways in which “the binary conception of privacy
cannot address the third-party privacy problem in the emerging surveillance society”);
Solove, supra note 11, at 1151–52 (“The Court’s jurisprudence in these [Third-Party
Doctrine] cases conceptualizes privacy as a form of total secrecy; however, this conception
is ill-suited for the circumstances involved in these cases. . . . Life in the modern
Information Age often involves exchanging information with third parties . . . . Thus,
clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of
privacy in today’s world.”).
22. Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 120; Selbst, supra note 13, at 643–44; Solove, supra
note 11, at 1091–92; Spencer, supra note 13, at 373.
23. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
24. See id. at 2478.
25. Id. at 2485.
26. Id. at 2489 n.1 (“[T]hese cases do not implicate the question whether the
collection or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other
circumstances.”).
27. See id. at 2489.
28. Id. at 2491. (“Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house . . . .”).
29. See id. at 2488 (“The fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests does
not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely . . . . The United
States asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is ‘materially
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In the Court’s view, the mere fact that we can now carry vast
amounts of personal information in our pockets does not mean we do
not expect some privacy in that data.30 Third-Party Doctrine critics
argue that the same is true of information held by third parties—it
subverts society’s expectations to hold that information stored on a
hard drive is private while information stored in the cloud is public.31
This Recent Development argues that when this more contextual
approach is applied to the warrantless collection of smart meter
data—information about activities that occur inside the home but
collected by a third-party provider—the Third-Party Doctrine
becomes irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment principles
articulated in Riley.
This Recent Development proceeds in three parts. Part I
discusses the development of the Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy doctrine, focusing on how the doctrine has evolved in the face
of technology. Part II discusses two categories of Fourth Amendment
interpretation: one that treats information privacy as a binary
public/private concept and another that treats expectations of privacy
as contextual. Part II argues that Riley’s approach to digital privacy
falls toward the latter category by subverting expectations and
attempts to put privacy back in context by grappling with the realities
of how we interact with technology and the expectations we have for
those interactions. Part II also notes that lower courts discussing Riley
have suggested that the Supreme Court might overturn the ThirdParty Doctrine if confronted with a set of facts that was Riley-esque
but where police obtained the data from a third party instead of
directly from an individual. Part III argues that those facts can be
found in the case of smart meters. By putting highly personal
information—one’s activities inside the home—in the hands of a third
party, the smart grid models the perverse effects of the Third-Party
Doctrine in the digital age.

indistinguishable’ from searches of [physical items such as cigarette packs]. . . . That is like
saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 78–92.
31. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 11, at 155 (“The Court, however, makes the mistake of
treating situations in which only a limited exposure has occurred as though there had been
this kind of total, irreparable exposure. . . . The idea is flawed because it ignores norms
about keeping confidences. . . . We do not expect, nor should we expect, that the strangers
with whom we deal will broadcast our secrets generally.”).
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I. THE PRE-RILEY FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Court’s Binary Approaches to Privacy
The binary approaches to the Fourth Amendment are
dichotomies that courts draw, essentially creating shortcuts to
determine whether a constitutionally protected privacy interest exists.
The first such dichotomy was whether the government had invaded a
“constitutionally protected area.”32 Before the Court introduced the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test in Katz v. United States,33 the
Fourth Amendment only applied to the “protected areas”
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment: “Persons [e.g., bodies],
houses, papers, and effects [e.g., cars].”34 Searches typically required
police to physically enter a person’s home.35 In Olmstead v. United
States36 and Goldman v. United States,37 the Court found that tapping
or otherwise eavesdropping on a person’s phone call was not a Fourth
Amendment search because it did not require penetration of the four
walls of the home or office.38 These early cases reflected the narrow
view that the ability to obtain information without entering into a
“protected area” excluded that information from Fourth Amendment
protection. For Fourth Amendment purposes, information was either
obtainable only in a protected area and therefore private, or the
information was public.
In 1967, the Supreme Court redefined the contours of the Fourth
Amendment when it decided Katz.39 The Court held that FBI agents
had conducted an unconstitutional warrantless search when they
attached an electronic recording device to the exterior of a public
phone booth and recorded Katz’s conversations.40 Rejecting the
appeals court’s reasoning that there was no search because the device
32. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57, 59 (1967) (“It is true that this Court has
occasionally described its conclusions in terms of ‘constitutionally protected areas’ . . . but
we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every
Fourth Amendment problem.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9 (1967) (citing
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 438 (1963).
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra note 32 and accompanying text.
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53 (“It is true that the absence of such [physical] penetration
was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry . . . for that
Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible property.” (citing
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928))).
36. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
37. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
38. 316 U.S. at 135–36; 277 U.S. at 466.
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–53.
40. Id.
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did not penetrate the wall of the phone booth, Justice Potter Stewart
declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. . . . [W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”41
The Katz Court still seemed to demand some level of secrecy,42 but it
rejected the idea that “constitutionally protected areas” could provide
a “talismanic solution” to Fourth Amendment questions.43
When the Supreme Court introduced the “expectation of
privacy” doctrine in Katz, it indicated that, to some extent, privacy
would turn on social norms.44 A phone booth might be more exposed
than one’s home, and a phone booth user may even know that his call
could be intercepted, but the Court acknowledged a societal
expectation that the content of one’s conversation would not flow
beyond the parties to the conversation.45 However, even as it
introduced this new doctrine, Katz maintained a binary
conceptualization of privacy that relied on the secrecy of
information.46 This secrecy model has become increasingly
problematic in the digital age.47 As new technology has made it easier
for law enforcement to collect formerly obscured information, courts

41. Id. at 351–52.
42. Id. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); Solove, supra note 11, at
1107 (“[T]he Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence adheres to the notion that matters
that are no longer completely secret can no longer be private.” (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at
351)).
43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
44. Courts adopted Justice Harlan’s interpretation of Katz, that the threshold
question of whether a search occurred is whether a person “exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy” and whether that expectation was “one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Colb, supra
note 11, at 123 (“[A]n honest inquiry into whether police have acted in a manner that
exposes what would have remained hidden absent the transgression of a legal or social
norm . . . would adhere to the doctrinal foundations of privacy as articulated in Katz.”); see
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (“[W]here an individual’s subjective
expectation [of privacy] had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms . . . [i]n determining whether a ‘legitimate expectation of
privacy’ existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.”).
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“But what [Katz] sought to exclude when he entered the
booth . . . was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made
his calls from a place where he might be seen. . . . [A] person in a telephone booth may rely
upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read
the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communication.”).
46. See Solove, supra note 11, at 1107 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
47. See id.
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have envisioned privacy as a “discrete commodity” that is wholly lost
once information is exposed.48 In United States v. Knotts,49 the Court
held that it was not a “search” to place a beeper in a suspect’s car and
monitor his location using the signal, finding that “[a] person traveling
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”50
Instead of evaluating whether society would expect a person’s every
move to be followed, the Court focused on the fact that the
movements occurred in public and were therefore vulnerable to
collection.51 By limiting Fourth Amendment protection to secret
information, the Court has traded one binary for another.52
The Third-Party Doctrine is an extreme expression of this binary
approach. The doctrine usually arises when law enforcement obtains
information without a warrant and uses it as evidence in a criminal
prosecution or to obtain a warrant.53 Under the doctrine, if
information is exposed to any third party for any reason, it is no
longer private and can be obtained without a warrant.54 The doctrine
first arose in United States v. Miller,55 but its widespread adoption
resulted from lower-court interpretations of Smith v Maryland.56 In
that case, the Court held that no search occurred when law
enforcement used a pen register device to obtain from the telephone
company a record of the numbers dialed by an individual.57 Justice
Blackburn, writing for the Court, found that Smith had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, since
48. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–14 (1986); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
49. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
50. Id. at 281.
51. Almost thirty years later, the Court considered similar facts in United States v.
Jones but relied on the traditional trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment to find that
an expectation of privacy was violated when police physically installed a GPS device on a
suspect’s vehicle. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
52. Solove, supra note 11, at 1107 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).
53. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (reviewing a case where the telephone company
installed a pen register without a warrant to record the numbers dialed from a phone);
United States. v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014) (involving historical cell site
location data that was obtained without a warrant); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d
500 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering a case where the government used computer surveillance
techniques without a warrant).
54. See Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–10.
55. 425 U.S. 435, 440–42 (1976) (holding that there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in financial documents “voluntarily conveyed” to a bank).
56. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
57. Id. at 745–46.
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telephone users “typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the company” for “legitimate business purposes.”58
The Court in 1979 could not have foreseen its impact on privacy in
the digital age, but the doctrine endures nonetheless.59
Now that most of our data is stored on third-party servers, the
Third-Party Doctrine has effectively removed vast amounts of digital
data—much of which includes personal information—from Fourth
Amendment protection. Information deemed open to warrantless
collection includes location data transmitted through cell phone
signals,60 IP addresses and other information provided to an Internet
Service Provider,61 and even files downloaded using peer-to-peer file
sharing software.62 As Part III will discuss, multiple federal courts
have found energy usage data to be subject to warrantless collection
from utility companies.63 In many ways, the Third-Party Doctrine
represents a return to outmoded ideas that the Fourth Amendment
only protects certain inherently private spaces. If the doctrine were
taken to its logical extreme, data stored on one’s phone would be
protected while the same data stored on a cloud server would be
unprotected.64 The doctrine betrays Katz by making this first-

58. Id. at 743.
59. Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1009 (D. Idaho 2014) (“Smith [v. Maryland]
could never have anticipated the ubiquity of cell-phones and the fact that ‘people in 2013
have an entirely different relationship with phones than they did thirty-four years ago.’ ”
(quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013))).
60. See United States. v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Application
of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013); In re
Application of United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(C) and 2703(D)
Directing AT&T, Sprint/Nextel, T-Mobile, Metro PCS and Verizon Wireless to Disclose
Cell Tower Log Information, No. M-50, 2014 WL 4388397, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014);
United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp.2d 341, 363 (D. Vt. 2013); United States v.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 390 (D. Md. 2012); United States v. Gordon, No. 09-15302(RMU), 2012 WL 8499876, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2012).
61. See United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v.
Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2013); In re
Application of United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp.
2d 114, 114 (E.D. Va. 2011).
62. See United States v. Dennis, 3:13-cr-10-TCB, 2014 WL 1908734, at *1 (N.D. Ga.
May 12, 2014); United States v. Thomas, 5:12-cr-37, 2013 WL 6000484, at *19–20 (D. Vt.
Nov. 8, 2013).
63. See United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.
2012); United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011); Naperville Smart
Meter Awareness v. Naperville, No. 11 C 9299, 2013 WL 1196580, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
22, 2013); State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 247 (Idaho App. 1993); see also infra Part III
(providing a more in depth discussion of the warrantless collection of energy usage data by
utilities).
64. In the Supreme Court’s Riley opinion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that it “makes
little difference” to the user (and that in fact the user may not even know) whether
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party/third-party dichotomy a “talismanic solution” to Fourth
Amendment questions.
B.

Contextual Approaches to Privacy

Despite this persistent trend, the Court has occasionally
recognized the contextual nature of privacy, acknowledging that
information can be vulnerable to collection without losing its
protection wholesale.65 The contextual approach to privacy was first
introduced by Helen Nissenbaum as the “contextual integrity” theory
of privacy,66 which has since been adapted as a Fourth Amendment
model by other scholars.67 According to Nissenbaum, privacy requires
“respect for the appropriate flow of information about identifiable
persons within particular social contexts.”68 Different contexts, such
as healthcare, home life, and finance, are governed by different
information norms. These norms are determined based on the
particular “actors” (the subjects, receivers, and senders of
information), informational “attributes” (the type of record, e.g., a
medical record), and “transmission principles” at play (e.g., whether
the record was disclosed for a specific reason or use or whether there
was a confidential relationship between the parties).69 Privacy is
violated when these norms are broken.70
In United States v. Jones,71 the Court acknowledged that
information once viewed as “public”—individuals’ movements from
place to place on public thoroughfares—might implicate privacy
interests when collected over a long period of time.72 However, the
Jones majority resorted to the binary “trespass” theory of the Fourth
Amendment to ultimately decide the case.73 In Kyllo v. United
States,74 the Court refused to apply such a “mechanical interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment” as to find that the use of thermal imaging
was not a search because it only detected heat radiating from a
home’s external surface.75 Instead, the Court found the use of
information found on a cell phone is stored on the phone itself or in the cloud. Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 67–72.
66. Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 136–37.
67. See Selbst, supra note 13, at 643–44.
68. Id. at 650 (citing NISSENBAUM, supra note 13, at 127).
69. Id. at 651.
70. Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 138.
71. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
72. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 950 (majority opinion).
74. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
75. Id. at 28.
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technology to obtain information about the interior of the home
analogous to physically intruding into the home.76 Unfortunately,
Kyllo also stopped short of a truly contextual approach to privacy.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion emphasized the use of technology
“not in general public use” to obtain information “regarding the
interior of the home” not otherwise obtainable without physical
intrusion.77 Kyllo thus left unanswered the question of whether a
technology in general use, such as a smart meter, could reveal
personal information in a context that is contrary to society’s
expectations. As Part II will discuss, Riley went a step further toward
contextualizing privacy.
II. THE RILEY COURT’S APPROACH TO DIGITAL DATA
In Riley, the Supreme Court considered whether cell phone data
fell under the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest warrant exception,
which allows officers to search an arrestee’s person, including items
found in his pockets, such as a cigarette pack.78 A unanimous Court
found that a warrant was required to search a cell phone because
“digital information on a cell phone . . . implicates substantially
greater individual privacy interests than a brief physical search.”79
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, compared a cell phone to
a person’s house80 in its capacity to hold different types of data in
large quantities and reveal “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life.”81
Moreover, the Court did not find that the search was justified based
on the “arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon being taken into
police custody.”82 The Court found the search to be more than a
“minor additional intrusion[]” into the arrestee’s privacy.83 Roberts
wrote that “[t]he fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests
does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture
entirely.”84 The Court declined to categorically subject to
unwarranted search all of an arrestee’s information simply because he
could carry it in a device in his pocket.85 Thus, the Riley Court
rejected a binary application of the Fourth Amendment and
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 34.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
Id. at 2478.
Id. at 2491.
Id. at 2489.
Id. at 2488.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2488–89.
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acknowledged that the nature of digital data and the context of
disclosure bear on society’s expectations of privacy.
The privacy interests in Riley turned on the ability of digital data,
when stored in large quantities, to reconstruct a person’s life.86 Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion focused on the “quantitative” and
“qualitative” differences between digital data stored on a cell phone
and physical objects such as a cigarette pack.87 Roberts wrote that cell
phones combine “immense storage capacity” with “the ability to store
many different types of information,” resulting in data “that reveal
much more in combination than any isolated record,” and allowing
“even just one type of information to convey far more than previously
possible.”88 Citing Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v.
Jones,89 the Chief Justice concluded that “[t]he sum of an individual’s
private life,” including his “specific movements down to the minute,
not only around town but also within a particular building,” could be
reconstructed through the data found on a smart phone.90 When large
quantities of data are stored in one place, each individual piece of
data—perhaps meaningless on its own—becomes more informative
by relation to the other data.91 Riley is the first majority Supreme
Court opinion to recognize this mosaic-like effect of cell phone data
and its privacy implications.92
The Riley Court’s approach to expectations of privacy was more
contextual than binary. The Court refused to view all information
found on an arrestee’s person as subject to disclosure because of its
proximity to the arrestee and because of the arrest itself.93 Instead,
the Court looked at the context of the disclosure and the nature of the
information to determine that an arrestee maintained a privacy

86. Id. at 2484.
87. Id. at 2489. In response to the government’s argument that a search of all data
stored on a cell phone was materially indistinguishable from searches of physical items,
Chief Justice Roberts famously wrote, “That is like saying a ride on horseback is
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.” Id. at 2488.
88. Id. at 2478–89.
89. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
90. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–90 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J.
concurring)).
91. Id; see Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955.
92. For a definition of “mosaic theory,” see Tracey v. State, 152 So.3d 504, 520 (Fla.
2014) (“The theory that discrete acts of surveillance by law enforcement may be lawful in
isolation, but may otherwise infringe on reasonable expectations of privacy in the
aggregate because they ‘paint an “intimate picture” of a defendant’s life,’ has been
referred to as the ‘mosaic’ theory.” (quoting United States v. Wilford, 961 F. Supp. 2d 740,
771 (D. Md. 2013))).
93. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
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interest in this immense trove of personal information.94 Viewed
through the lens of Nissenbaum’s theory, the inquiry in Riley was
sensitive to the change in informational attributes between a cigarette
pack, which is limited in its ability to contain information, and a cell
phone, which has limitless informational value. The Court understood
that this difference affected the social norms governing the disclosure
of information in each case.95 While we might expect the physically
tangible items we carry in our pockets to be searched and even seized
if we are taken into police custody, we do not expect all of the
contents of our cell phones—contacts, text messages, emails,
documents, pictures—to be disclosed just because we can also carry
that data around in our pockets.
Despite the fact that Riley explicitly did not overturn the ThirdParty Doctrine,96 at least one lower court has noted its potential
impact on future digital privacy cases that do implicate third parties.97
In United States v. Guerrero,98 the Fifth Circuit upheld the warrantless
collection of historical cell site location information (“CSLI”) based
on the fact that the government obtained the information from a third
party.99 While nothing in Riley would allow the Fifth Circuit to ignore
the Third-Party Doctrine precedent, the court suggested that perhaps
the ‘technology is different’ rationale that led the Riley Court to
treat an arrestee’s cell phone differently from his wallet will one
day lead the Court to treat historical cell site data in the
possession of a cellphone provider differently from a pen
register in the possession of a pay phone operator.100
The court added that “commentators have debated the effect Riley
may have if a ‘third party’ case involving modern technology were to
end up at the Court.”101 The next part of this Recent Development
argues that a challenge to law enforcement collection of smart meter
data could be just such a case.

94. Id. at 2490–91.
95. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
96. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 n.1. Riley only concerned the collection of data directly
from a person’s device and not from a third party, and the fact that the data collection was
a search was not at issue. See id. at 2484.
97. United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2014).
98. 768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014).
99. Id. at 358.
100. Id. at 360.
101. Id.
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III. SMART METERS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The current application of the Fourth Amendment to utility data
ignores the possibility that society might expect the data to be
disclosed in certain contexts and not in others. Since utility data is
created specifically to be collected by a utility company and can only
be collected from a third party, all data generated about a
household’s use of electricity, regardless of its ability to reveal
personal information, falls outside of the Fourth Amendment.102
Utility data concerns information from inside one’s home, the core of
Fourth Amendment protection.103 Smart meter data ups the ante by
providing infinitely more information about the lifestyles and
behaviors of a household’s inhabitants.104 This is a paradigmatic
example of how the Third-Party Doctrine subverts society’s
expectations of privacy by classifying information as either wholly
private (if secret) or wholly public (if disclosed).
This Part provides background information on smart meters and
the smart grid and discusses the privacy problems associated with
smart meters. It then discusses the case law, which reveals that the
Third-Party Doctrine has removed Fourth Amendment protection
from utility data, including smart meter data. This Part concludes with
an argument that a contextual approach to Fourth Amendment
expectations of privacy would protect smart meter data from flowing
beyond utility companies but for the inharmonious Third-Party
Doctrine. Thus, the Supreme Court should follow the trajectory it
started with Riley and overturn the Third-Party Doctrine.
A. Smart Meters and Privacy
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Title XIII,
established a national policy to modernize electricity transmission and
distribution.105 Part of the policy involves implementing new
technologies to increase the amount and flow of information about
energy use between consumers and utilities.106 Taken together, these
technologies make up the “smart grid.”107 As part of this effort to

102. See supra text accompanying notes 1–11; infra text accompanying notes 105–10.
103. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 42 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
104. See NIST, supra note 2, at 26.
105. See generally Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17381 (2012)) (including energy independence and
security as one of several clean energy goals).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 17381 (2012).
107. Id.
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modernize the grid, utility companies increasingly are installing smart
meters on consumers’ homes.108 In 2011, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration reported that more than thirty-three million U.S.
utility customers had smart meters.109 Three million additional smart
meters were installed between January and August 2012, and the
agency estimated that the number of customers with smart meters
would exceed eighty million by 2015.110
In many places, smart meter adoption is all but compulsory.
Utility companies typically inform the consumer that a smart meter
will be installed and then send an employee to install the meter.111 In
2012, responding to consumer complaints, the California Public
Utilities Commission required Pacific Gas and Electric Company to
provide consumers in California the option to opt out of smart meter
installation.112 Some other states have opt-out processes, some of
which involve charging an opt-out fee.113 Other states do not provide
information or instructions to consumers for opting out.114
Smart meters constantly collect fine-grained data on a
household’s electricity use and transmit the data to the utility
companies as frequently as every fifteen minutes.115 They generate up
to 3,000 data points per month per household.116 The meters are
touted as a tool to help consumers save energy and money by keeping
track of their energy use patterns over time.117
These detailed records of electricity usage can reveal when a
person goes to bed every night and wakes up every morning, how
108. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 3, at 1.
109. See id.
110. Id. attachment B, 1.
111. Federico Guerrini, Smart Meters: Between Economic Benefits and Privacy
Concerns, FORBES (June 1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguerrini/
2014/06/01/smart-meters-friends-or-foes-between-economic-benefits-and-privacyconcerns/.
112. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Agenda ID No. 10870, at 40 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Nov.
22, 2011), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/PD/153864.pdf.
113. Terrence Henry, Want to Opt Out of a Smart Meter in Texas? It Will Cost You,
NPR (Oct. 30, 2013), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/10/30/opt-out-of-a-smart-meterin-texas-it-will-cost-you/.
114. Duke Energy’s smart grid information web pages, for example, do not include
information about opting out. See Grid Modernization FAQs, DUKE ENERGY,
http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/smart-grid-faq.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
115. Tracy Idell Hamilton, Smart-meter Energy Data Now Online, SAN ANTONION
EXPRESS-NEWS (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/energy/article/Smartmeter-energy-data-now-online-2133522.php.
116. Lee Tien, New “Smart Meters” for Energy Use Put Privacy at Risk, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 10, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/new-smartmeters-energy-use-put-privacy-risk.
117. Id.
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many people live in a household, when people are at home and out of
town, and even what specific appliance is being used at a given
time.118 Over time, these data can reconstruct a detailed picture of
people’s behavior and private lives.119 A Privacy Impact Assessment
conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) concluded that the data collected by smart meters raise
privacy concerns because they can reveal consumers’ lifestyle
information and information about the use of specific appliances.120
New smart appliances come with unique “load signatures,” which can
be identified through the analysis of smart meter data.121 By recording
these load signatures, smart meters can reveal when and for how long
a particular appliance was used.122 This information can provide
insight into personal health information such as eating and exercise
habits.123 In a 2012 study in Germany, researchers were able to
analyze smart meter data to determine what television programs a
household was watching.124 Thus, smart meter data implicates not
only energy usage but also behavioral information and potentially
even media consumption and communication records.
As new localities continue to introduce smart meters, the data
they collect remains largely unprotected. In its Privacy Impact
Assessment, the NIST found a “lack of privacy laws or policies
directly applicable to the smart grid.”125 Only a few states have passed
laws limiting disclosure of utility data, and no federal law directly
addresses this type of information.126 This treasure trove of
information about people’s behavior will attract public and private
entities alike that want to mine the data for commercial or
surveillance purposes.127 Insurance companies, for example, might
want to monitor the activities of households that are covered by their
policies.128 Companies that sell smart appliances may want to monitor

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

NIST, supra note 2, at 27.
Id.
Id.
CDT & EFF Joint Comments, supra note 7, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Robertson, supra note 2.
NIST, supra note 2, at 21.
Id.; PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF THE STATE OF CAL., RULEMAKING 08-12-009,
ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO CONSIDER SMART GRID TECHS. PURSUANT TO
FED. LEG. & ON THE COMM’N’S OWN MOT. TO ACTIVELY GUIDE POLICY IN CAL.’S DEV.
OF A SMART GRID SYS., 83–87 (July 28, 2011).
127. CDT & EFF Joint Comments, supra note 7, at 5.
128. Id. at 6.
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the use of those appliances for warranty purposes.129 Some advertisers
have already expressed their intent to use this data.130 WPP, the
world’s biggest advertising agency, announced that it was teaming up
with a London-based software company to study ways to collect smart
meter data, saying that it would “open the door of the home.”131 And
law enforcement, the focus of this Recent Development, may be
interested in collecting smart meter data as part of criminal
investigations.132 Like the cell phone at issue in Riley, smart meters
can store and transmit, in large quantities, different types of personal
information.133 However, because of the infrastructural design of
smart meter technology, law enforcement officers can and do collect
this data not from individuals directly but from third-party service
providers.134
B.

Law Enforcement Collection of Utility Data

Law enforcement historically has used energy use records in
criminal investigations, usually involving marijuana-growing
operations.135 In the years since Smith v. Maryland was decided,
courts have relied on the Third-Party Doctrine to hold that no
warrant is needed for the collection of these records from utility

129. Id.
130. Kantar Group Ltd., whose clients include Coca Cola and Microsoft, is undertaking
a pilot study on “ways to harvest smart-meter data on household energy use that may be
useful to customers . . . . Companies wanting to market their products . . . could potentially
benefit from information [contained in smart meter data], such as how long people spend
cooking or using their computers.” Louise Downing, WPP Unit, Onzo Study Harvesting
Smart-Meter Data, BLOOMBERG (May 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201405-11/wpp-unit-onzo-study-harvesting-smart-meter-data.html.
131. Robertson, supra note 2.
132. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. See generally Naperville Smart Meter
Awareness v. City of Naperville, No. 11C9299, 2013 WL 1196580 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2013)
(dismissing claim from town’s citizens that smart meter installation in every home violates
the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
133. See supra notes 115–24 and accompanying text.
134. In a 2012 report, California energy company San Diego Gas & Electric reported
that it had disclosed the records of 4,062 customers pursuant to the “legal process.” SAN
DIEGO GAS & ELEC., ANNUAL PRIVACY REPORT 2 (May 16, 2013), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/1AAFED95-3F3F-4296-B4B68CB8E6704CC1/0/SDGEAnnual_Privacy_Report_2012.pdf.
135. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); United States v. Golden
Valley Elec. Assoc., 689 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. McIntyre, 646
F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2011); State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 250 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
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companies.136 Most of these cases have involved traditional utility
records, which show aggregated measures of energy use.137
In United States v. Golden Valley Electric Association,138 the
Ninth Circuit held that consumers lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in energy consumption records because they had “no
possessory or ownership interest” in the records held by a utility
company.139 In Golden Valley, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) served an administrative subpoena on Golden Valley, an
electricity cooperative, to provide energy consumption records
pertaining to three customer addresses.140 Golden Valley, which had a
company policy of protecting the confidentiality of members’ records,
challenged the subpoena on Fourth Amendment grounds.141
Although the administrative subpoena was subject to relaxed Fourth
Amendment standards, the Ninth Circuit addressed the consumers’
privacy interest in utility records.142 Relying on United States v.
Miller,143 which involved the collection of bank records, the Court
held that “[a] customer ordinarily lacks ‘a reasonable expectation of
privacy in an item,’ like a business record, ‘in which he has no
possessory or ownership interest.’ ”144 The court further concluded
that the energy usage records were not “inherently personal or
private.”145 Thus, instead of inquiring into society’s expectations
regarding the disclosures, the Ninth Circuit conceived of utility
records as “inherently” not private, based on the fact that they were
held by a third party and thus out of the consumers’ physical control.
It ignored the confidential relationship between the utility company
and its customers and the effect of that relationship on the social
norms governing the flow of information.
In Idaho v. Kluss,146 the Court of Appeals of Idaho adopted
Smith v. Maryland’s binary “voluntary disclosure” approach to

136. See Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1111; McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1113; Kluss, 867 P.2d at
249.
137. See Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1111 (involving power consumption records);
McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1113 (involving usage records); Kluss, 867 P.2d at 250 (involving
power consumption records).
138. 689 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012).
139. Id. at 1116.
140. Id. at 1111.
141. Id. at 1113.
142. See id. at 1115–16.
143. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
144. Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1116.
145. Id.
146. 867 P.2d 247 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
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privacy.147 In Kluss, an Idaho Bureau of Narcotics officer obtained
defendant Kluss’s power consumption information without a warrant
from a utility company in order to determine whether Kluss was using
special marijuana “grow lights.”148 The officer was able to compare
Kluss’s consumption to that of the previous residents to determine
that Kluss’s consumption was high.149 The officer used this
information to obtain a subpoena for the written utility records and a
warrant to search Kluss’s home.150 Kluss was ultimately convicted of
growing and possessing marijuana.151 The court held that, under Smith
v. Maryland, “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” and thus the
Fourth Amendment does not protect utility records.152 This
“voluntary disclosure” approach ignores the context of disclosure and
its effect on expectations of privacy. It treats any disclosure to any
party for any reason as a voluntary ceding of all privacy protection.
In United States v. McIntyre,153 the Eighth Circuit acknowledged
that utility records can reveal normally protected information about
the inside of a person’s house but still declined to protect that
information when law enforcement collected it from a third party.154
In McIntyre, Nebraska State Patrol investigator Jason Sears obtained
defendant McIntyre’s electricity usage records using an administrative
subpoena.155 Sears discovered a spike in McIntyre’s electricity usage
for November 2008, which later turned out to be inaccurate, and cited
that spike in an affidavit to obtain a warrant for thermal imaging to
detect a marijuana growing operation.156 McIntyre argued that
investigators should have obtained a warrant because his utility
records “contained intimate details about the interior of his home.”157
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed that there was no expectation of
privacy in information revealed to a third party, “even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed.”158 The language of McIntyre is telling. It reveals the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 252.
Id. at 249–50.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 252.
646 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Id. at 1111 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
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Third-Party Doctrine’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as
completely divorced from social norms and expectations of
confidentiality.
McIntyre argued that “power records are different” because they
reveal information about the interior of one’s home.159 He relied on
Kyllo, arguing that the information obtained was indistinguishable
from that in Kyllo.160 The court rejected McIntyre’s argument because
“the manner in which the information was obtained in Kyllo” bore
“no resemblance to obtaining power data from a third party.”161 Thus,
while McIntyre and Kyllo both concerned information about the
interior of the home, Kyllo did not apply because the officers in
McIntyre could obtain the information from a third party without
using “sense-enhancing technology.”162 This interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment resembles the outmoded “constitutionally
protected areas” doctrine.163 The court used arbitrary digital
boundaries to define expectations of privacy rather than conducting a
normative inquiry into society’s expectations.164
In 2013, the Northern District of Illinois applied the Third-Party
Doctrine to smart meter data in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v.
City of Naperville.165 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness (“NSMA”),
a coalition of Naperville, Illinois residents who were required to have
smart meters installed at their homes or businesses, sought to enjoin
Naperville from installing the smart meters until reasonable privacy
safeguards were in place and a satisfactory alternative option for all
customers was available.166 The court extended Smith v. Maryland,
finding that the residents consented to having their information
monitored by transmitting it to the utility company.167 Naperville did
not involve the collection of information from a third party—the
objected-to collection was by the third party itself. By extending the
Third-Party Doctrine in this case, the court equated plaintiffs’
knowledge of the data collection with consent, even though the
plaintiffs were suing in objection to the collection itself. This rationale
is an example of a “well-known logical trap” in which the knowledge
of data collection is equated with the inability to expect privacy in the
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
See McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111.
No. 11 C 9299, 2013 WL 1196580, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2013).
Id.
Id. at *11.
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data.168 The knowledge-as-consent rationale is particularly
counterintuitive in the case of utility meters, which are necessary
fixtures for most people who use electricity.169
The cases applying the Third-Party Doctrine to utility data take a
binary approach to information privacy. Even though customers
disclose their data only to the utility company for the limited purpose
of billing, this limited disclosure exempts the information from Fourth
Amendment
protection.
Reasonable
assumptions
about
confidentiality between the consumer and the utility company do not
bear on the courts’ inquiry into whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists. This approach is contrary to that in Riley, which
recognized that the specific context of a disclosure—not the storage
method or vulnerability of the data to collection—determines
whether society expects privacy.170
C.

A Contextual Approach to Smart Meter Privacy

This Recent Development has argued that Riley adopted a
much-needed contextual approach to digital privacy by (a)
acknowledging that digital data, stored and aggregated in large
quantities, can reveal a detailed picture of an individual’s private life,
imbuing each individual piece of data with an informational value
that it might not have had standing alone, and (b) refusing to equate
the vulnerability of information with a loss of privacy interests.
Applying the same principles to smart meter data would support its
protection under the Fourth Amendment.

168. Selbst, supra note 13, at 659.
169. For a discussion of the consent rationale in the cell phone context, see In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info.,
809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that, because of the ubiquity and
necessity of the cell phone in modern society, “[t]he fiction that the vast majority of the
American population consents to warrantless government access to [cell site location
records] by ‘choosing’ to carry a cell phone must be rejected”).
170. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–91 (2014) (“The fact that an arrestee
has diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of
the picture entirely. Not every search is acceptable solely because a person is in custody.
To the contrary, when privacy-related concerns are weighty enough, a search may require
a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee. . . . The
United States asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is ‘materially
indistinguishable’ from search of [physical items such as cigarette packs]. That is like
saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. . . . A
conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pocket works no substantial
additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to
physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own
bottom.”).
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The type of information that can be learned from collecting and
analyzing smart meter data lies at the core of Fourth Amendment
protection.171 Smart meters implicate privacy by aggregating hundreds
of thousands of data points that together reconstruct the behavioral
patterns of a household.172 Law enforcement already uses traditional
utility data to learn information from inside the home, and smart
meters would only increase the amount, types, quality, and accuracy
of information available to law enforcement.173 Information inside the
home is the paradigmatic example of the Fourth Amendmentprotected sphere.174 In Katz, the Court abandoned the
“constitutionally protected areas” that limited warrant requirements
to physical intrusions into the home.175 In Kyllo, it confirmed that the
use of an electronic device to obtain such information was a Fourth
Amendment search.176 In Riley, the Court found that the search of a
cell phone, with its large capacity to store many different types of
data, was similar to searching one’s home.177 Like a cell phone, smart
meters are designed to collect vast amounts of digital data from inside
the home—data that is even more revealing than that obtained by the
heat sensors used in Kyllo. Smart meters combine the newer digital
mosaic concerns raised in Riley with the time-tested privacy of the
home as enshrined in the Fourth Amendment’s history. Through
smart meters, information once protected by physical boundaries now
flows electronically and is aggregated in a way that it could not have
been before this technology existed. The question of smart meter
privacy thus demonstrates the need for Fourth Amendment standards
to adapt to protect traditional privacy concerns in the digital age.
Under the Third-Party Doctrine, the type of information
collected by smart meters would be protected if obtained without a
warrant directly from a person’s home, but not from a third-party
utility company. This binary public/private conception of the Fourth
Amendment is a regression to the “constitutionally protected areas”
doctrine abandoned in Katz—that is, the idea that information is
private only if stored in a protected, “private” place.178 A contextual
approach to privacy, like the one adopted in Riley, requires asking not
171. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30–31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
172. NIST, supra note 2, at 5; Robertson, supra note 2.
173. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 5.
174. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
175. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9 (1967).
176. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
177. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
178. See supra text accompanying note 175.
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whether the information was obtained from a protected area or
whether it was “inherently” private, but whether society would expect
the information to have the potential to be exposed in a particular
context. It requires asking whether, upon having a meter installed
that automatically relays energy usage data to a utility company for
billing purposes, a person expects that the data can be shared with law
enforcement and other agencies without additional consent or a
warrant.
Under a contextual lens, the role of the home as a social
institution is one of solitude and seclusion.179 Thus, warrantless
collection of information from inside the home typically violates
social norms. Other evidence provides additional insight into the
social norms that govern the transmission of smart meter data. Smart
meter data is transmitted to the utility company for billing purposes
and to help both the utility and the household manage electricity
use.180 Evidence from the case law surrounding smart meters suggests
that customers may, at least implicitly, expect a utility company to
maintain confidentiality in energy usage data.181 California’s reporting
requirements and the response to recent reports of disclosures suggest
that the disclosure of an individual’s smart meter data to a third party
without express consent violates social norms.182 Thus, social norms in
the context of smart meter data would prohibit the data from flowing
beyond the utility company.
While the Third-Party Doctrine is couched in the language of
“reasonable expectations,” it never actually examines them. Instead,
it equates the “voluntary” disclosure of data to a third party for a
specific business purpose with consent to disclose the same data to
law enforcement.183 If the information flows to any third party for any
reason, all privacy is forfeited. This approach resembles the
outmoded “constitutionally protected areas” doctrine in its reliance
on binary distinctions. However, even the “constitutionally protected
areas” approach placed paramount importance on the privacy of the

179. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
181. United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012)
(noting that Golden Valley had “a company policy of protecting the privacy of its
members,” but finding no “agreement with its customers” to that effect). Even in the
absence of an explicit confidentiality agreement, Golden Valley’s contention suggests that
utility companies and customers may implicitly assume a confidential relationship.
Regardless of whether the law would support such a relationship, this indicates at least a
subjective expectation of confidentiality. Id.
182. SAN DIEGO GAS & ELEC., supra note 134.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 167–68.
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home, a concept that has endured throughout the history of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.184 Privacy scholar Andrew Selbst argued
that the privacy of the home is an area that “would generate a
consensus between” traditional Fourth Amendment analysis and a
contextual approach to privacy.185 Under current law, “courts have
said that the ‘home’ is such a quintessentially private place that
physical intrusion even by a ‘fraction of an inch’ is too much.”186
Under Selbst’s contextual analysis, “the home is a specific social
context . . . subject to the transmission principle of control by the
resident.”187 Allowing unwarranted intrusion in this context “would
destroy the home as a social institution, generally seen as the one
place it is always safe to retreat.”188 Applying the Third-Party
Doctrine to smart meter data, as Selbst warns, would erode the
integrity of the home by exposing the activities and behavioral
patterns of its residents.189 In the case of smart meters, the ThirdParty Doctrine is thus incongruous not only with a contextual
approach to privacy but also with longstanding Fourth Amendment
values.
CONCLUSION
This Recent Development has argued that Riley’s approach to
digital data, although it did not address the Third-Party Doctrine, will
inevitably lead to the doctrine’s undoing. In Riley, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that old ideas about expectations of privacy do not
hold up when law enforcement collects digital data.190 Because an
arrestee’s pocket, which was once fair game for container searches,
can now hold information in digital form about every aspect of the
arrestee’s life, the context of that pocket and the social norms
surrounding it have changed. Because Third-Party Doctrine’s binary
approach to digital privacy does not accommodate such changing
circumstances and norms, it will produce results that are contrary to
basic reason and Fourth Amendment values, such as protecting data
that is saved to a hard drive but not protecting the same data saved to
184. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“[P]hysical invasion of the
structure of the home, ‘by even a fraction of an inch,’ [is] too much . . . .” (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))).
185. Selbst, supra note 13, at 668.
186. Id. at 667 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37).
187. Id. at 667–68.
188. Id. at 668.
189. Id. at 668–69.
190. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2888–91 (2014).
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a cloud storage account. This incongruity is perhaps most apparent in
the context of smart meters, where, under the Third-Party Doctrine,
the Fourth Amendment fails to protect the home—the original
impetus for the right to privacy.
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